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COASE DEFENDS COASE: WHY LAWYERS
LISTEN AND ECONOMISTS DO NOT
Stewart Schwab*

THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW. By Ronald Coase. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1988. Pp. vii, 217. ,$29.95.
In The Firm the Market and the Law, Ronald Coase has collected
five of his major articles and has newly written a thirty~one-page introduction and twenty-nine-page reply to his critics:. The'book is a slim
one, but Coase's resume has always shown quality rather than sheer
output. The book is certain to attract attentioI.I: when the founding
guru of law and economics responds .to his critics, people will listen.
And it is worth listening, for we can gain insight into the Coas~ Theorem by seeing the tacks Coase takes in defending himself. O,f equal
interest, however, is the book's overall tone. In the new material (and
in several of the reprinted articles) Coase complains of being ignored.
Most legal academics would scoff at the charge; Co~se's rea~ complaint
is that fellow economists have igno~ed his i_deas and approach to
economics.
I begin this ess.ay, in Part I, by briefly describing how· the contents
of this book emphasize Coase's main themes. In Part II, I evaluate
Coase's technical responses to his critics, for the responses can help us.
understand the Coase Theorem. In Part III, I explore the implicatio.ns
of legal scholars' fascination with Coase compared with the more
stand-offish treatment.he receives from mainstream economists. It is
here that paradigms and politics come to the fore.
I.

THE THEMES OF COASE

Coase has repeatedly emphasized transaction costs as the key to
understanding economic institutions. In his classic 1937 article, The
Nature of the Firm (pp. 33-55), Coase asks why firms exist when, alternatively, workers and owners of capital could come together in a decentralized way through individual contra,cts made in open markets.
The answer, Coase suggests, is that markets are expensive: individual
prices are costly to determine and individual contracts are expensive to
• Associate Professor, <;:ornell Law School. B.A. 1975, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1980,
Ph.D. 1981, University of Michigan. - Ed.
I had stimulating conversations about these issues with Don Gjerdingen, David Lyons, Steve
Shaven, Steve Shilfrin and Hal Varian. I also benefited from presenting the argument to the
faculty workshop at Michigan Law School and the law and economics workshops at Boalt Hall
and Stanford law schools.
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write and enforce (pp. 38-40). The firm, with its internal markets,
arises to avoid these costs. To understand the firm, then, one must
examine how the firm avoids the costs of markets. In the even more
famous The Problem of Social Cost (pp. 95-156), published in 1960,
Coase asks why firms cannot optimally solve conflicts that arise when
their actions harm each other. The answer, again, is the costs of bargaining. If these costs were zero, Coase as'serts, parties would maximize their joint output, regardless of which side had the initial right to
harm the other. This is the famous Coase Theorem.
Transaction costs are not the only unifying theme in Coase's work.
Also ever-present is Coase's skeptical view of government intervention
in private markets. 1 Those familiar with The Problem of Social Cost
will recall the tone of its latter sections. As an illustration, consider:
The kind of situation which economists are prone to consider as requiring corrective governmental action is, in fact, often the result of governmental action. Such action is not necessarily unwise. But there is a
real danger that extensive governmental intervention in the economic
system may lead to the protection of those responsible for harmful effects
being carried too far: [p. 133]

The anti-government view is even more prevalent in another essay reprinted in this volume, The Marginal Cost Controversy (pp. 75-93),
originally published in 1946. Coase thinks of this essay, along with the
two more famous articles, as "the core of this book," stating that "all
embody essentially the same point of view" (p. 1). The Marginal Cost
Controversy argues that utility companies with declining marginal
costs should charge a dual price: a set fee to capture the fixed overhead costs, and a quantity charge to reflect the marginal costs. The
view he attacked assumed that efficiency required government regulation: the government would subsidize the fixed costs and require the
monopoly to set price equal to marginal cost.
The final two reprints amplify Coase's dual themes. Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research (pp. 57-74), first published in 1972
as a conference paper, reiterates the importance of transaction costs in
understanding markets, and bemoans the fact that The Nature of the
Firm is an article "much cited and little used" (p. 62). Coase calls for
more institutional study by industrial organization economists. The
last article in the volume, the Lighthouse in Economics (pp. 187-213),
first published in 1974, emphasizes the anti-government theme as well
as the need for detailed institutional analysis. Economists have often
used the lighthouse as an example of something that must be provided
by the government as a collective good - since the marginal cost of
1. In Part III I will ask whether these two themes are necessarily linked (i.e., whether one
can agree with Coase that a rich contextual study of transaction costs is the best way of understanding the interplay between the law and the market, without concluding that unregulated
markets are generally superior to government intervention). For now I merely report that the
transaction cost and anti-government themes pervade these articles.
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another ship using a· lighthouse is zero. In this article, Coase gives an
extensive historical account of the British lighthouse system, revealing
that lighthouses were often privately financed and operated. Coase
claims not that lighthouses should be left to private enterprise (that
must await detailed study), but that economists should not use the
lighthouse as an obvious example of a service that only government
can provide.
Although the five pieces thus present two unifying themes - the
importance of transaction costs in understanding economic institutions and the dangers of government intervention in the economy one might wonder why Coase excluded other of his pieces. For example, his 1972 piece on durable goods, 2 and his writings on the economic view of man3 remain important and admirable works. But such
are the problems of a gifted scholar looking back on over fifty years of
work: some worthy articles must be slighted.
More interesting is how Coase does not emphasize another, probably more fundamental insight that his work reveals: his conception of
externalities as a reciprocal problem. Lawyers and economists typically think the polluter causes the pollution problem, the spark-generating railroad causes the fire hazard, and the crop-trampling cows
harm the farmer. But Coase's approach emphasizes that the problem
is reciprocal and that the law makes a choice in protecting these "victims." By so doing, the law harms the harm-causing actors. As I tell
my torts students, it takes two to tort.
II.

DEFENDING THE COASE THEOREM

One of the famous points in the exegesis of The Problem of Social
Cost is that Coase never states a theorem. In the present book, Coase
credits George Stigler with coining the term "Coase Theorem" and
first formulating it precisely.4 Coase also comes close to stating the
theorem himself when he reiterates the argument of The Problem of
Social Cost. In a world of zero transaction costs, Coase repeats, "the
allocation of resources would be independent of the legal position" (p.
174). Thus, in Coase's famous rancher/farmer parable, the parties
would produce the same amount of cattle and com under a rancherfavoring open-range law or a farmer-favoring enclosure law (assuming
zero transaction costs) (pp. 13-14, 97-104).
2. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 143 (1972).
3. Coase, Adam Smith's View of Man, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 529 (1976).
4. Coase quotes Stigler: "[U]nder perfect competition private and social costs will be equal"
(p. 158) (quoting G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966)). Coase suggests that
the qualifying phrase "under perfect competition" is unnecessary. P. 175. I agree. Most interpreters of the Coase Theorem have applied it to bargaining situations of bilateral monopoly
rather than to competitive markets where all actors take prices as given. Robert Cooter has well .
analyzed the competitive market and bargaining strains of the Coase Theorem. See Cooter, The
Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982).
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The Coase Theorem has at least two major formulations. s Coase
has here stated the weak version: the allocation of resources is independent of the legal position. The weak version is consistent with
some inefficient bargains, as long as the legal position does not contribute to the inefficiency. The strong version asserts that bargains are
efficient regardless of initial legal entitlements. Coase, in his new statement, does not claim 100% efficiency, suggesting only that the proportion of inefficient bargains "will be small" (p. 161). Coase thus seems
to advocate the weak version of the Coase Theorem.
Coase vigorously defends this Theorem from the central theoretical attacks that twenty-five years of scholarship have developed. His
concessions are minor and grudging. Coase finds the critiques,
although often persistently made by able economists, "for the most
part, either invalid, unimportant or irrelevant" (p. 159). Nevertheless,
in part because Coase left much of the detailing of his argument to
others, we can glean useful' insights about the Theorem from seeing
how Coase replies to his critics.

A. Efficient Bargains
Coase first responds to critics questioning the basic assumption
that, with zero transaction costs, parties will reach an agreement that
maximizes joint wealtl;t. Coase singles out as a critic Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson. Readers of the legal literature may be more familiar with similar and more extensive arguments by Donald Regan 6
and Robert Cooter. 7 Samuelson argues that the Coase Theorem envisions a situation of "insoluble bilateral monopoly ... with all its indeterminacies and nonoptimalities." 8 Rational self-interest "does not
necessitate that there will emerge, even in the most idealized gametheoretic situation, a Pareto-optimal solution that maximizes the sum
of two opponents' profits, in advance of and without regard to how
that maximized profit is to be divided up among them." 9 The economic theorist, says Samuelson, can rule out non-Pareto-optimal out5. See Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237,
242-43 (198.8).
6. ·Professor Regan criticizes the Coase Theorem for offering no model of individual behavior
from which one can deduce that, even without transaction costs, efficient bargains will always
occur. Regan suggests by way of counter-example that individually rational threats of noncooperation will occasionally lead to inefficient bargaining outcomes. Regan, The Problem of Social
Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 427 (1972)..
7. Cooter, supra note 4, at 1. Cooter suggests that .the Coase Theorem presents the rosiest
assumption about bargaining. He introduces the polar opposite theorem, the Hobbes Theorem,
which assumes that "people will exercise their worst threats against each other unless there is a
third party to coerce both of them." Id. at 18. See also notes 37-44 infra and accompanying text.
8. P. 159, quoting Samuelson, Modem Economics Realities and Individualism, TEXAS Q. 128
(Summer 1963), reprinted in 2 P. SAMUELSON, THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL
A. SAMUELSON 1411 (1966).
9. P. 161, quoting Samuelson, 3 P. SAMUELSON, supra note 8, at 35 (emphasis omitted).
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comes only by fiat or by tautologically redefining what constitutes
nonrational behavior.
Coase, not wanting to resort to fiat or tautology, concedes Samuelson's theoretical point by acknowledging that "[i]t is certainly true
that we cannot rule out such [a non-Pareto-optimal] outcome if the
parties are unable to agree on the terms of exchange ..." {p. 161).
But, he insists, "there is good reason to suppose that the proportion of
cases in which no agreement is reached will be small" {p. 161).
Note how limited Coase's concession is. He admits that occasionally parties will fail to agree, but assumes that whenever agreement is
reached it will be optimal. The only inefficiency Coase recognizes,
then, is failure to make the deal, ignoring the possibility of an inefficient deal. When parties are bargaining over a single, indivisible item,
Coase is correct that inefficiency occurs only when the deal falls
through. But Coase ignores deals involving mUitiple or divisible items.
For example, if the issue is how many cows the rancher can let roam,
and both sides are bluffing about the value and costs of roaming, one
can: easily imagine the farmer agreeing to. let the rancher graze only
two cows when three would be the efficient number.
Coase relies on Edgeworth in defense here. Edgeworth's famous
box shows two people with initial quantities of two divisible goods
trading to make both of them better off. 10 The Edgeworth analysis
does not predict the precise bargain that the parties will reach, but
does insist that the parties will continue trading until they have exhausted all possible mutually beneficial trades. Only when the parties
reach the Pareto-optimal contract curve (the points where no trade
can benefit both parties) do the parties stop- trading. Coase recognizes
the similarity between Edgeworth's analysis and his own assertion that
parties will make all mutually beneficial trades, 11 and notes that the
indeterminacy of the final result does not imply that the result is nbnoptimal (p. 163).
Another strategy against Samuelson, which Coase does not follow,
would be to deviate from Edgeworth and fall back on the weak-efficiency version of the Coase Theorem. While standard bargaining theory may not demonstrate that bargainers ·always· reach · efficient
bargains, the Coase Theorem remains relevant for p"olicymakers as
long as bargainers tend towards efficiency and initial legal entitlements
do not affect the degree of inefficiency. For example; the· weak-efficiency hypothesis of bargaining would be supported by finding that
80% of rancher/farmer d~als ?fe efficient whether bargaining around
an enclosure rule or an open-range rule.
,
10. F.Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS 20-29, 54-56 (1881).
11. Coase suggests that an unconscious memory of Edgeworth's Mathematica/ Psychics,
which Coase studied some 50 years ago, may have helped lead him to the Coase Theorem. P.
160.
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The major point, despite the narrowness of Coase's concession, is
that Coase recognizes that theory cannot rule out the possibility that
parties, even with zero transaction costs, may not always reach efficient bargains. This concession destroys any dogmatic or tautological
view of the Coase Theorem. The tautological Coase Theorem insists
that parties must reach efficient bargains under zero transaction costs,
so that if one sees an inefficient bargain it must be due to transaction
costs. 12 Coase clearly does not take this tack here. He recognizes that
individually rational bargainers may not reach efficient bargains under
low transaction costs, but suggests that the proportion of cases will be
small. In other words, the Coase Theorem should be viewed as an
empirical, potentially falsifiable prediction. If we see many transactions that are inefficient, or if varying legal rules affect the level of
efficiency even when transaction costs seem low, we should reject the
theorem.
By destroying the tautology, of course, one no longer has a "theorem," for theorems are simply interesting tautologies. (Perhaps we
should call the insight the Coase Prediction rather than the Coase
Theorem.) The real issue, however, is whether the strong tautology
that "parties will bargain to an efficient solution unless something prevents them from doing so" is interesting. I find it more interesting to
concede that bargaining theory does not show that all parties reach
efficient bargains, even under ideal conditions, and to inquire whether
waivable legal entitlements affect bargains. Coase may be sympathetic
to this approach.
One advantage of this approach is that the Coase Theorem, as I
will continue to call it, loses some of its dogmatic character. Some
free-market advocates attempt to apply the tautological Coase Theorem in reverse to "prove" the efficiency of unregulated bargains. If
transaction costs do not seem significant in a particular situation, these
advocates infer that the parties must be bargaining efficiently. Without an explicit theory of bargaining or observations about efficiency,
this proof amounts to little more than faith.
Another advantage of viewing the Coase Theorem as an empirical
predic~ion is that one can accommodate the approach of Robert
Cooter. Cooter argues that the key impediment to efficient bargains is
not transaction costs, but strategic bargaining. 13 Even with zero trans12. See, e.g., Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules, 11 J.L. &
67, 68 (1968).
13. Cooter, supra note 4, at 17-29. Some scholars, particularly those treating the Coase Theorem as a tautological proposition, incorporate strategic bargaining as an aspect of transaction
costs. See, e.g., R. POSNER, EcONOMIC .ANALYSIS OF LAW 54-55 (3d ed. 1986). Whenever
parties fail to reach an efficient bargain, transaction costs must be present, but one possible transaction cost is strategic bargaining. One problem with lumping strategic bargaining together with
transaction costs is that the policy remedies are very different. To remedy strategic bargaining, a
policymaker attempts to reduce the worst threats a bargainer can impose (e.g., by a quantum
meruit theory of paying the other party the value of its work, even if the parties could not agree
EcON.
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action costs, says Cooter, bluffs, threats and other strategies to get a
larger share of the gains of trade may prevent the parties from trading
at all. Cooter suggests a Hobbes Theorem14 as a polar opposite to the
Coase Theorem: parties will always carry out their worst threats and
never reach efficient bargains, unless a Leviathan controls the strategic
behavior.
The empirical issue between Coase and Cooter (or Hobbes) is
clear: With zero transaction costs, how often will parties reach an
efficient bargain, and what circumstances will increase the likelihood
of efficient bargains? Some empirical work along this line has begun, 15
and it seems a fruitful way to interpret the costless Coase Theorem.
In this book, Coase makes only an armchair empirical defense of
his theorem by observing that we "do not usually seem to let the problem of the division of the gain stand in the way of making an agreement" (p. 162). Indeed, he notices that raw materials, machinery,
land, and buildings are bought and sold all the time. Coase can easily
explain this: Those who cannot conclude agreements will neither buy
nor sell and will earn little income. Such uncooperative traits have
little survival value. Thus, Coase finds it plausible that humans are
inclined to "split the difference" and make the deal, rather than avoid
mutually beneficial bargains (p. 162).
Coase's Social Darwinism may be convincing in competitive or
thick markets where cooperative individuals have alternatives to dealing with someone who threatens or bluffs. In situations of bilateral
monopoly, however, uncooperative traits may well be able to survive.16 Successful bargainers must trade off the number of deals made
and the share they get of each deal. Bluffs and threats often help get a
on a contract). To remedy transaction costs, one attempts to make the mechanics of negotiating
easier (e.g., by making it easier for parties to get together; or by interpreting contract clauses to
be those that typical parties would make, so that only unusual parties need undertake the costs of
drafting explicit clauses on these issues).
14. Cooter, by modestly not calling this the Cooter Theorem, wisely distances himself'. from
Coase's extreme approach.
15. See, e.g., Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass Law, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 149 (1987); Ellickson, Of Coase and Cottle.· Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986); and Donohue, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells, (mimeo 1988) (on file with the Michigan Law
Review). Experimental testing on the Coase Theorem has been done by Hoffman and Spitzer in a
series of articles; see, e.g., The Coase Theorem: $ome Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 73
(1982); Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts
ofDistributive Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985). See also Harrison & McKee, Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 653 (1985); Schwab, supra note 5. Again,
not everyone agrees that the Coase Theorem should be viewed as an empirical proposition. See,
e.g., Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach
to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 221, 225 (1980) ("Coase's theorem is not an empirical claim but is
instead an analytic truth about what it means, under certain conditions, to act rationally.").
16. And, as one who has recently been through the house-hunting rat race, the observation
that buildings are bought and sold does not convince me that parties never fail to make mutually
beneficial deals.

Michigan Law Review

1178

[Vol. 87:1171

higher share but cause some deals to fall through. Certainly a plausible strategy is to maximize neither the number of deals nor the share
per deal, but to bluff a little to gain a higher share, recognizing that a
few deals may fall through.
I do not want to push the value of nasty bargaining too far. Work
by Axelrod 17 and Frank, 18 for example, emphasizes that cooperative
strategies (we can call them Coasean strategies) can survive, even in a
cut-throat, selfish world. My main point, with which I think Coase
would agree, is that the issue of how often parties reach efficient bargains under low transaction costs should be resolved by empirically
testing theories of bargaining.
B.

Wealth Effects and the Invariance Thesis

Legal entitlements not only have possible efficiency effects but may
also affect the distribution of wealth between the parties. Supporters
of the Coase Theorem have not focused on these wealth effects, 19 but
wealth distribution is an important element in public policy and thus
the effects are worthy of study in their own right. Further, critics of
the Coase Theorem have used wealth effects to attack Coase's "invariance" efficiency claim.
Coase, in The Problem ofSocial Cost, argued not only that parties
would reach an efficient bargain regardless of initial legal entitlements,
but also argued the stronger "invariance thesis" that parties will reach
the same efficient result regardless of initial legal entitlements. This
invariance claim has led to one of the more confusing chains in the
Coase theorem literature, leading Cooter in 1982 to make the blanket
conclusion that "now there is agreement that the invariance version is
untenable." 20 A major argument against the invariance thesis relies
on the wealth effects of legal entitlements. Whether parties trade initial legal entitlements depends, in Coase's view, on whether the holder
values an entitlement less highly than another user. But value depends
on a person's willingness and ability to pay for the entitlement, which
in turn depends on a person's wealth. If initial legal entitlements affect
wealth, and wealth affects valuations, then initial placement of the
legal entitlement may affect who values it most highly. Initial placement thus may change which outcome is efficient, destroying the invariance thesis. In this book, however, Coase defends the invariance
thesis, with only the most grudging qualifications, by denying that
legal entitlements affect wealth distribution. It is.worth reexamining
the debate.
17.
18.
19.
20.

R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).

R. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON (1988).
See, e.g., Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 15, at 93 n.47.
Cooter, supra note 4, at 15.
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In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase assumed that legal entitlements would affect wealth. For example, in discussing the farmer/
rancher parable, he concluded that an agreement to waive an entitlement to compensation "would not affect the allocation of resources
but would ... alter the distribution of income and wealth between the
cattle-raiser and the farmer" (p. 100). Many later writers likewise
state flatly that, according to the Coase Theorem, legal entitlements
affect wealth distribution but not the efficient allocation of the entitlement. 21 But the issue is more subtle, and indeed not yet fully resolved.
A basic distinction exists between property entitlements and contract entitlements. Demsetz suggested that property rights affect
wealth distribution but contract rules do not. 22 For example, the
rancher with an open range right immediately benefits from letting his
cattle run free from liability. The rancher may sell this right if it is
worth more to the farmer, but it is worth something to the rancher
and thus increases his wealth. A contract right, by contrast, gives
value only if the nominal beneficiary gets a contract to which the benefit attaches. An implied warranty of habitability, for example, benefits
the tenant only if she can get a lease. But to get such a lease, the rent
must cover the cost of the warranty. to the landlord. Thus contract
rights do not increase the wealth of the nominal beneficiary, at least in
competitive markets.23
Waivable contract rights (or contract presumptions) may, in some
situations; increase the wealth of the nominal benefi.ciary. 24 The basic
line is probably between thick, competitive markets and thin markets
where individual bargaining over surplus occurs. In competitive markets, price equals cost and cost is the minimum possible cost; if the
contract presumption would increase costs, the parties will write
around it (assuming low transaction costs), and cost and price remain
unchanged. But in markets where price can exceed cost, a favorable
contract presumption ma:y increase one's bargaining power. Even if
the beneficiary waives the presumption, he may receive a greater share
of the surplus for doing so:
21. See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 12 (1983) ("[T)he
choice of the legal rule redistributes income by the amount of the least-cost solution to the conflict"); Coleman, supra note 15, at 225 ("The traditional understanding of Coase's theorem might
be summarized follows: allocative efficiency ... does not depend on the initial assignment of
entitlements. • • . The initial assignment of entitlements, however, does affect the relative wealth
of the competing parties simply because. the assignment determines which party has to do the
purchasing (or what -economists misleadingly call 'bribing')."
22. Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 16-18 (1972).
For a critique, see Schwab, supra note -S.
23. I have contrasted property rights and contract rules in more detail elsewhere. See
Schwab, supra note 5. One qualification to the blanket statement in the text is that a non-waivable or coercive contract rule will affect wealth if the rule mandates greater benefits than the
beneficiary would voluntarily pay for. Such coercive rules are inefficient: depending on the specific context, the rule may increase or decrease the relative wealth of the beneficiary.
24. See Schwab, supra note 5.
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Thus, the line between contract rules and property rights may not
be as clear as supposed, with some contract rules, as well as property
rights, having wealth effects. But one should not overemphasize the
wealth effects of property rules. Property rights are transformed into
contract rights when the initial entitlement-holder sells the right.
Buyers cannot benefit from the open-range rule until they purchase
ranch land. But the price of ranch land with open-range rules will
exceed the price of ranch land where ranchers are liable for damage,
offsetting the value of the rule. The wealth of subsequent ranchers is
thus unchanged by the legal rule.
Demsetz first noted that the value of the legal rule will be internalized in the price. He suggested, however, that a change in legal rules
would give windfall gains or losses to the current owners of land. For
example, a rancher who bought his land under an enclosure rule
(thinking he would have to pay for fencing) is suddenly wealthier
when the rule switches to open-range. Although later ranchers will
pay more for the land, eliminating the wealth effect, Demsetz argued
that a switch in legal rule would create a one-time wealth effect. 25
Coase, however, now challenges even the one-time wealth effect
(assuming zero transaction costs). As he puts it, "a change in the liability rule will not lead to any ·alteration in the distribution of wealth"
(p. 171). Rejecting wealth effects, Coase can flatly call the wealth distribution argument against the invariance thesis "wrong" (p. 171). To
make the argument, Coase emphasizes the power of the zero-transaction-costs assumption. With zero transaction costs, contracts could be
written and enforced to cover every contingency, including a possible
switch in legal rules. For example, a land purchase contract could
give a rebate if the legal rule became less favorable to the buyer. The
zero-transaction-costs assumption eliminates any timing problem.
Even if the legal rule switches decades later, the seller will immediately give the buyer a rebate.
Such a fanciful contract illustrates the bizarre character of a world
with zero transaction costs. Coase's argument does not work in a
world with a time dimension, where buyers cannot rely on sellers reappearing years later to readjust contracts. Consider a buyer and seller
of ranch land bargaining under the shadow of a favorable open-range
rule. The parties know that the land will be less valuable if the legal
rule ever switches. If the deal must be consummated now (rather than
having the timeless luxury of waiting to see if the rule indeed
switches), the price will be discounted by the probability of a switch in
legal rule. Nevertheless, the buyer will lose if the rule actually
switches, for he must now incur the costs of fencing without paying a
fully discounted price for the land. If so, the switch in rule would
affect wealth.
25. Demsetz, supra note 22, at 19-22.
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Coase concedes that entitlements affect wealth if contracts cannot
anticipate all contingencies. He gives the example of a newly discovered asset, such as a cave (pp. 157, 173-74). Even in a world of zero
transaction costs, says Coase, it is hard to conceive of parties dealing
with contingencies they cannot anticipate. 26 In the cave example in
his 1959 article The Federal Communications Commission, 27 Coase argued that "[w]hether the cave is used for storing bank records, as a
natural gas reservoir, or for growing mushrooms depends, not on the
law of property, but on whether the bank, the natural gas corporation,
or the mushroom concern will pay the most in order to be able to use
the cave. " 28 Coase now admits that it "never entered my head" (p.
173) to qualify this argument with wealth effects. If the demand for
mushrooms differs among the possible claimants to the cave, the assignment of title will affect the relative demand for mushrooms, natural gas, and bank services. The resulting change in relative prices may
alter the amount the various businesses are willing to pay for the cave,
thus possibly affecting the way the cave is used. Coase concedes that it
is "conceivable" (p. 174) that the criteria for assigning ownership to
previously unrecognized rights, if it leads to dramatic changes in relative demand, may alter the allocation of resources. But apart from
"such cataclysmic events as the abolition of slavery, these effects will
normally be so insignificant that they can safely be neglected" (p. 174).
Coase's limited concession suggests when wealth effects are most
likely to invalidate the invariance thesis. The cave example, like all of
Coase's examples, involves legal entitlements for producers rather
than consumers. Increasing the wealth of a producer does not alter its
willingness and ability to pay for factors of production. Rather, producers will choose the level and combination of factors that maximizes
profits. Thus, awarding a legal entitlement to a business firm, even if it
alters its wealth, does not affect the firm's willingness and ability to
pay for the entitlement. Since the initial legal award does not alter
willingness and ability to pay, the legal award does not directly affect
which outcome is efficient. So far, then, the invariance thesis remains
intact.
But as Coase admits, the wealth created by a firm's legal entitlement conceivably has an indirect effect on the valuation of the entitlement. This occurs when we consider the possible changes in demand
that occur as the legal entitlement alters the wealth of the firm's shareholders. Demand will change if the consumption patterns of shareholders differ systematically by firm. For example, ranch owners may
26. A "zero transaction cost" zealot would say that this limitation on information means it is
not a zero transaction cost situation, but Coase is not quite so zealous.
27. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1959). This article
is the precursor to The Problem of Social Cost.
28. Coase, supra note 27, at 25.
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love bread while farm owners prefer steak (smelling cows all day
makes one a vegetarian, perhaps). If the initial legal entitlement favors ranchers, and bread and steak are normal goods, the relative demand for bread will be higher than otherwise. If the effect is great
enough, it could be profitable to tum some ranch land into farm land.
If so, the invariance thesis is destroyed because the efficient allocation
of resources will depend on initial legal entitlements.
This indirect effect of the change in shareholders' income seems
far-fetched. A more natural assumption is that the relative demands
of shareholders do not vary systematically by firm. If so, the wealth
effects of initial legal entitlements to firms will n.o~ change the efficient
outcome.
More serious, however, are the wealth effects arising when the
legal decision involves consumers rather than prodµcers. A property
entitlement can increase a consumer's wealth. 29 This shifts out his
budget constraint, directly affecting his demand for goods, including
his willingness and ability to reject offers to purchase his entitlement.
This direct effect of the legal entitlement on a consumer's budget constraint makes wealth effects more significant for consumers .than producers. Correspondingly, the invariance thesis becomes more
problematic for consumer entitlements.
As an example, compare a Civil-War-type di;aft, which lets draftees buy their way out for, say, $40,000 per period, with a volunteer
army paying $40,000 per period. The qqestion is whether, as the invariance thesis claims, the same people will be in the army in either
case. Some people, unwilling or unable to pay $40,000 to escape the
draft, would reject the lure of a volunteer army paying $40,000. People are wealthier when the army has to bribe them· in, and this directly
increases their willingness and ability to pay for civilian life. 30 'Even
though the result may be efficient in either case, it is a different efficient result.
In sum, two things must occur for wealth effects to invalidate the
invariance thesis. First, the legal entitlement must affect wealth. Second, the wealth must so greatly change the willingness and ability to
pay for the entitlement that the most highly valued user of the entitlement changes. Property rights are more likely than contract rules to
29. We must remember' Coase's argument that legal rules have no wealth effects because
contracts can anticipate all legal rules that might affect the item in question. See text following
note 25 supra. Coase's argument, which was not completely convincing for entitlements affecting
producers, has even less force for entitlements affecting consumers. If parents had the perfect
foresight implied by zero transaction costs, they might be able to anticipate the legal rules under
which their children and grandchildren would live, but no contract price regulates the changing
value of children's entitlements. Unlike the goods that producers use or make, people are not
bought and sold. Thus, although parents might anticipate a draft, they will not be compensated
for the fall in their children's wealth.
30. See Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights, 19 AM. EcoN. AssN. PAP. & PROC.
347, 349 n.2 (1967).
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have wealth effects, so the invariance thesis is more plausible for contract rules. Among rules with wealth effects, only those involving consumers, as opposed to producers, will directly affect the willingness
and ability to pay for the entitlement. · The invariance thesis is thus
more plausible for entitlements involving producers. 31
C. Rents and the Invariance Thesis

Consider the size of a rancher's pocketbook and herd under both
an open-range law and an enclosure law. The invariance thesis insists
that the law will not affect the size of the herd (again, assuming low
transaction costs and the absence of wealt9. effects). Under either law,
the rancher adds cattle until the value of another cow equals its marginal cost. Under an enclosure law, where the rancher is liable for corn
damage, the cost of the extra steer is the rancher's greater liability for
corn damage. Under an open-range rule, the cost of the extia steer is
the opportunity cost of forgoing the farmer's bribe.
Suppose when the rancher is liable he will not add a sixth cow to
his herd; because the val\le of the corn trampled by this sixth cow (for
which he is liable) exceeds the value of this sixth cow. When the law
switche$ to an op~n-range rule~ the Coase· Theorem relies on the bribes
of farmers to for~e the rancher to internalize the trampling costs and
ensure the same result.
Regan and ot\lers have noted that this story assumes farmers are
earn4J.g economic rents and thus are able and willing to bribe ranchers
to reduce the size of th~ir herd. 32 Econo~c rents occur, by definition,
when the farmer earns more t\lan he could in his next-best alternative. 33 If the farmer is earni~g only a normal return in farming (meaning he could do as well in an alternate job), he is not earning rents but
ollly normal profits. The traditional economic picture of a competitive
market insists that at least some farmers (and perh.aps all farmers)
31. Kelman has emphasized the problems of applying the Coase Theorem to consumers (implicitly suggesting it has greater plausibility for producers). He argues that "[c]onsumers do not
behave in a way such that the Theorem holds true." Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 678 (1979). Kelman goes
well beyond the issue of wealth effects (although many economists try to limit Kelman's arguments to wealth eirects), declaring that consumers treat realized costs differently from opportunity costs.
32. Regan, supra note 6; Auten, Discussion, in THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF EcONOMIC
EXTERNALmES 38 (S.A.Y. Lim. ed. 1976).
33. The technical definition of "rent" differs from ordinary usage, where rent is what a tenant
pays a landlord. The two are connected, however. Economists first applied their technical definition of rent to income earned from land. It was thought that land would remain in production
as land (what else could it be?) no matter how inuch a landlord received for it or how much it
was taxed. The income earned was greater than that necessary to keep it used as land, and was
thus "rent." See Alchian, Rent, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS

141-43 (1987).
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earn zero rents. 34 But a farmer earning zero rents can do as well in
another occupation, and would therefore refuse to pay the rancher a
positive bribe to earn zero rents. Rather, the farmer would turn to the
other occupation which also earns normal profits and does not require
a bribe. Regan suggests this contradicts the invariance claim. The
farmer is willing to farm when the legal rule favors farmers. But when
the rule switches, the farmer must pay a bribe and now turns to another occupation. 3s
Coase finds Regan's contention "plausible" but "wrong" (p. 164).
Suppose the farmer has the initial entitlement. Since he earns no rents
from farming, he would be willing to sell his entitlement for an infinitessimal sum and turn to alternative occupations and investments. If
the rancher can have the entitlement for free, asks Coase, how can one
say the rancher does not have the right to it? Liability and non-liability are interchangeable at will. The rancher and farmer, each earning
zero rent, "are equally likely to stay or leave. What will happen is
completely unaffected by the initial legal position" (p. 165).
Coase's argument is clever. The marginal producer is indifferent
between operating and not operating. The definition of a person earning zero rents, or only normal profits, is that she could do as well
elsewhere. Such a person oscillates between production and nonproduction even without a switch in legal entitlement, so the switch cannot be the cause of the oscillation. The ambiguity in land use arises
because the activities are equally efficient, not from shifting legal entitlements. The invariance thesis survives this attack.

D. Coase and Pigou
One senses that Coase sees his life's work as an effort to combat the
evil of Arthur Pigou, an early twentieth-century British economist. 36
The Pigovian approach emphasizes that a "natural" or laissez-faire
economy will not be optimal when the private costs of an action differ
from its social costs. These externalities37 create a presumption that
34. If all farmers are earning extra-normal profits, then resources would flow into fanning,
absent some entry barrier - violating the Coasean invariance prediction.
35. Regan, supra note 6, at 434-35.
36. Coase reveals that he possesses Pigou's copy of a 1904 work on Municipal Monopolies,
and has studied Pigou's markings and comments to discover his manner of working. P. 22 n.33.
The "bent of Pigou's mind" suggests no "real interest" in the details of his subject. P. 22. Coase
reports that Pigou's biographer notes that Pigou always sought "realistic illustrations for quotation in his own work." Id. (quoting Robinson, Arthur Cecil Pigou, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCY·
CLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 92, 94 (1968)). But, Coase responds, by acquiring illustrations
in this way, Pigou often fails to realize their significance. P. 23.
37. Most modem economists label the divergence between private and social cost an "externality" problem, and view Coasean private bargains as one way of solving the extemality problem. Coase credits Paul Samuelson with coining the term in the 1950s. P. 23 n.35. Coase here
explains why he never used the term "externality" in The Problem ofSocial Cost, but spoke only
of an action's "harmful effects." His goal was to show that the right to incur a "harmful effect"
was no different than the right to any other factor of production, and that sometimes it is useful
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government intervention can improve the situation through liability
rules or, more commonly, through taxes and subsidies.
Coase's reaction to this Pigovian approach was, of course, a major
theme of The Problem ofSocial Cost. In a "brilliant, theoretical counterattack, "38 Coase observed that in a frictionless and perfect-information world in which the omniscient Pigovian government operates,
private parties could solve the externality problem without government help. In our world of transaction costs, private parties do not
eliminate externalities when the transaction costs of doing so exceed
the benefits. Likewise, however, the costs of government intervention
may exceed the benefits. The mere presence of externalities in our
economy does not create a presumption that action by a real-world
government - an authority that is "ignorant, subject to pressure, and
corrupt" (p. 26) - is preferable to an untamed externality.
But Coase, in The Problem of Social Cost, went beyond observing
that private parties do not need a government in a Pigovian world
(except for the background function of setting clear entitlements and
enforcing bargains). Coase argued that Pigou "was mistaken in his
economic analysis" (p. 138), that "the Pigovian analysis seems to give
the wrong answer" (p. 141), and that "both the analysis and the policy
conclusions [of the Pigovian tradition] are incorrect" (p. 149). Coase
insisted that intervention by even an ideal Pigovian government might
be worse than laissez-faire. This stronger argument has proved most
controversial.
In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase analyzed two classic examples (both taken from Pigou) to demonstrate that government intervention could be worse than laissez-faire, even assuming private
parties could not make bargains. The first example involves the railroad whose sparks burn farmers' crops. Pigou thought the railroad
would operate too many trains unless the government made the railroad liable for damage to the farmers, thereby forcing it to consider
the full costs of operating trains. 39 Coase presented a numerical example showing that imposing liability could lower the overall social output. The reason, Coase explained, is that if farmers were compensated
for the value of their burnt crops, they would not care if their crops
to eliminate harmful effects from production - and sometimes it is not. As employed today, the
term "externality" carries with it the connotation that the government should take steps to eliminate them. Pp. 26-27. Coase realizes his effort in terminology was clearly unsuccessful, because
even sympathetic observers call The Problem of Social Cost a study in externality. P. 27.
38. Professor Horwitz has characterized the Coase Theorem as a "brilliant counterattack"
on the presumptive validity of state intervention in private markets. See Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. R.Ev. 905, 906 (1980).
39. Coase faulted Pigou's historical research in proposing this example of the inadequacy of
laissez-faire. P. 23. A statute of Parliament exempted railroads from common law liability for
sparks. Thus, government intervention imposed no liability. As Coase's critique here shows,
Coase (along with many law and economics scholars) sharply distinguishes intervention by the
legislature from rules created by common law.
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burn, and so would put their crops too close to the railroad. This
inefficient behavior could outweigh the railroad's inefficiency, under
no liability, of running too many trains.
The second example concerns the infamous factory that pollutes
nearby residences. Here the Pigovian solution - as Coase interpreted
it - was to tax the factory an amount equal to the damage to neighboring properties from each additional puff of smoke. The flaw in the
Pigovian solution, according to Coase, is similar to the flaw in the
railroad example: residents will move too close to the factory, ignoring the extra taxes they impose on the factory. As residents approach
· the factory, the factory's tax rate rises, inducing the factory to install
more expensive pollution-abatement devices. A cheaper solution,
however, may be to have residents live elsewhere. Coase suggested
that a tax system, if used at all, should tax the factory and the residents an amount equal to the additional costs incurred by the factory
to avoid the damage. Under a single-tax system, Coase thought, there
would be too little smoke and too many people near the factory. This
Pigovian tax solution may be worse than the no-tax result of too much
smoke and too few people (pp. 151-53).
Others have since shown that Coase overstates Pigou's errors.
Robert Cooter, in an important article, analyzed the railroad spark
parable.40 Coase assumed that railroad liability meant the railroad
would have to pay farmers the market value of the burnt crops. From
this assumption Coase correctly concluded that farmers may grow
crops too close to the railroad, not caring if they are destroyed. But,
Cooter demonstrates, if the measure of damages is the fall in the farmers' land value rather than the value of the burnt crops, a liability
scheme will induce farmers to place their crops an efficient distance
from the tracks and will induce the railroad to run the efficient
number of trains. 41 Farmers will not gain from putting valuable crops
close to the tracks, for they are compensated only for the difference in
the best use of the land without sparks and the best use with sparks.
Thus, Cooter demonstrated, a liability policy where damages are based
on the fall in farmer's land values will always be more efficient than a
program of no liability (assuming that transaction costs prevent
bargaining).
William Baumol has repelled Coase's attack on the Pigovian tax
solution to the pollution problem. 42 "[T]aken on its own grounds,"
Baumol insists, "the conclusions of the Pigovian tradition are, in fact,
impeccable."43 Just as- Coase chose a wrong measure of damages in
40. Cooter, supra note 4.
41. Id.
42. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. EcoN. REV. 307 (1972);
see also w. BAUMOL & w. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975).
43. Baumol, supra note 42, at 307.

May 1989]

Coase ·Defends Coase

1187

the railroad example, Cease emphasized the wrong measure of taxes
here. A government tax, based not on damages particular residents
suffer but on the fall in land values from pollution, can induce an optimal amount of pollution and an optimal amount of residential development near the factory.
In these new notes, Cease continues to trash Pigou. The Pigovian
approach, he says, has had an "extraordinary hold ... on the minds of
modem .economists" and Coase's hope is "to weaken that hold" (p.
159). Cease realizes that "[s]ome have suggested that I was too harsh
in my criticism of Pigou, but I believe what I said was essentially correct'' (p. 20). Cease was "essentially correct" to emphasize that a policy analyst must compare either an ideal laissez-faire world of zero
transaction costs (where, according to the Coase Theorem, externalities do not exist) with an ideal Pigovian government solution, or compare the inefficiencies of a world of externalities (arising from high
transaction costs) with the costs of intervention by an imperfect government. Nevertheless, Coase has had to back away from his extreme
rhetoric that even ideal government intervention may be worse than
the externalities it tries to correct.
Cease admits as much in responding to Baumol's critique.44 He
concedes that "Baumol's taxing system is conceivable and if put into
practice it would have the results he describes" (p. 182). But, heargues, the information required on which to base a tax is immense.
Cease sees "no way in which the information required for the Pigovian
tax scheme could be collected" (p. 184).
Cease concludes by ridiculing economic theorists, 45 with their extensive use of complicated math:
My point was simply that such tax proposals are the stuff that dreams
are made of. In my youth it was said that what was too silly to be said
may be sung. In modem economics it may be put into mathematics [p.
185].

Coase's rhetoric is still too strong. Yes, modem mathematical economics is difficult to understand and translate immediately into policy.
But the rigor is useful in forcing the modeler to articulate assumptions. For example, hidden ambiguities about a liability scheme can be
forced into the open when one must write, "court award = x," and
must describe x as either a function of damages to crops or of the fall
44. It is a shame that Coase apparently is not familiar with Cooter's The Cost of Coase, supra
note 4, for it contains, in addition to an analysis of the proper measure of damages, several other
penetrating observations of the Coase Theorem. In particular, it would have been interesting to
hear Coase's reaction to the "Hobbes Theorem," which Cooter posits as the polar opposite to the
optimistic Coase Theorem. See supra note 7.
45. Coase has long disparaged mathematical economists. For example, in his 1946 article on
The Marginal Cost Controversy, Coase finds much of the literature, "at least to the nonmathematical reader," irrelevant to the foundation of the argument. P. 76 n.5. Later in that 1946 article,
he dismisses "Hotelling's mathematical formulation" as coming "to much the same thing." P.
83 n.18.
;.
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in land values. Coase's reluctance to use mathematics contributed to
the ambiguity in his argument.
Coase's major point on methodology, however, remains valid. An
advocate of intervention must compare the costs and benefits of a government solution with the private solution, and not presume that private imperfections imply that government intervention will improve
things. But Coase's trashing of the theoretical consistency of the
Pigovian approach remains unconvincing. If he means to attack the
increasingly technical approach of economists, he indeed is crying in
the wilderness (and his prophecies will not be heard for a long time).
If he is calling for more institutional analysis to enrich stark models
(the work of Oliver Williamson comes to mind) 46 then he is on
stronger ground. I return to this point in examining why economists
ignore Coase.

III.

THE ATTRACTION OF LAWYERS {BUT NOT ECONOMISTS)
TO COASE

Coase's new writings have the tone of an old prophet looking back
on others frolicking behind, oblivious to the "long, arduous, but rewarding journey" of the Coasean approach (p. 31). My message, bemoans Coase, has been ignored. Humbly, Coase says, the fault may
partly arise from "inadequacies in my exposition" (p. 1). But that cannot fully explain the shunning, for Coase thinks his ideas are so simple
that seemingly anyone should fully embrace them upon hearing the
argument. "[T]he argument in these papers is, I believe, simple, so
simple indeed as almost to make their propositions fall into the category of truths which can be deemed self-evident ... " (p. 1).
That his ideas have been ignored rather than embraced suggests,
says Coase, that economists have a fundamentally different way of
looking at economic problems, and thus ignore, reject or misunderstand his argument. Economists assume frictionless markets, whereas
Coase emphasizes transaction costs. Economists analyze the appropriate policies of a perfect government, whereas Coase emphasizes that
the governmental cure may be worse than the private-market disease.
Economists, snipes Coase, have a bent for "blackboard economics,"47
whereas a serious analysis of transaction costs in a particular situation
46. 0. WILLIAMSON, THE EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
SON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975).

(1985); 0. WILLIAM·

47. In blackboard economics, the teacher "fixes prices, imposes taxes, and distributes subsidies (on the blackboard) to promote the general welfare." P. 19. "Undoubtedly," says Coase,
blackboard economics is "an exercise requiring great intellectual ability, and it may have a role in
developing the skills of an economist, but it misdirects our attention when thinking about economic policy." P. 19. To formulate economic policy, says Coase, we must examine how "the
economic system would work with alternative institutional structures." Pp. 19-20. Similarly,
Coase says sarcastically, the Pigovian approach of taxing externalities has, whatever its merits,
"the added attraction... [of] look[ing] impressive on a blackboard or in articles, and [in requiring] no knowledge of the subject." P. 179.

•
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requires more than a simple graph. And we have already noted how
disparaging Coase has been of the mathematical trend in modern
economics. 48
Some economists might deny Coase's charge that their profession
has ignored him. Coase's two major articles appear frequently on
reading lists in Industrial Organization or Public Finance and are
often cited in the literature. But, Coase would reply, referring specifically to The Theory of the Firm, the paper is "much cited and little
used" (p. 62).
Assessing whether someone's work is little used or influential is
difficult. For our purposes, the prime issue is not whether economists
ignore Coase in some absolute sense, but whether the relative attraction is stronger for legal scholars than economists. To anyone who has
scanned a recent law review, the idea that Coase complains of being
ignored must come as a shock. Contemporary legal scholarship
clearly takes Coase and his Theorem seriously and expends considerable effort exploring the implications of his approach. Tort, contract,
and property scholarship are chock full of references, and public law
subjects ranging from administrative law to zoning are not far behind.
Although he and his Theorem are not without controversy in the law
schools, and indeed may be on the defensive in recent years, Coase can
hardly complain of being ignored in the law school world.
One bit of comparative evidence might be found in the relative
rates of citation to Coase in legal and economics journals. A search of
the Social Science Index 49 revealed 1109 citations to The Problem of
Social Cost since 1972. Of these, 53% were in journals whose primary
subject was law, while only 32% were in journals whose primary subject was economics (15% of the cites were to journals in other subjects).50 This evidence is consistent with Coase's claim that he is
relatively ignored by economists. 51
Textbooks may be a better place than journal articles to search
for influence. Coase does receive a mention in Samuelson's introductory textbook, Economics, 52 but not in Varian's graduate level
48. See supra text at note 45.
49. I thank Barbara Vaccaro, Reference Librarian at the University of Michigan Law
School, for her efforts in this search.
50. Lest lawyers think this is due to the over-abundance of law review articles, law subject
journals contained only 84,043 articles since 1972 while economics journals had 131,580 articles
(Law and economics had 2318 articles). Thus, economists had over 50% more articles from
which they could generate cites.
51. In absolute terms, The Problem ofSocial Cost is probably one of the most-cited articles in
the law review world. See Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1540, 1546 (1985) ("without question [it] would have qualified for the tabulation of most-cited
articles if Journal ofLaw and Economics were indexed by Shepard's"). See also GREAT AMERICAN LAW REVIEWS (R. Berring ed. 1984) (including The Problem ofSocial Cost in an anthology
of the 22 "greatest" pre-1965 law review articles).
52. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, EcONOMICS (12th ed. 1985). The reference is hardly

1190

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:1171

text. 53 In contrast, many of the leading casebooks in torts, contracts,
and property deal with Coase, some extensively.
Citation evidence from articles or textbooks is far from conclusive.
One problem is the possibility of "obliteration." Some writers - and
Coase may be among them - are so influential that their ideas become integrated into the common body of knowledge and scholars no
longer explicitly cite their work. 54 Problematically, obliteration occurs more often in economics scholarship, which does not have the
penchant of law review writing to cite everybody for everything. 55
Thus, the relative frequency of Coase citations in law journals may
reflect styles of citatiori rather than degree of influence. A greater
problem is that a citation merely reflects awareness of the work's existence, rather than agreement. Clearly; many legal scholars citing
Coase disagree vehemently with his approach and conclusions. Nevertheless, hostility itself reflects influence. Those attacking the Coasean
approach find it sufficiently disturbing to merit a response, and a view
that is largely ignored rarely merits response.
I do not rely on citation evidence when I claim legal scholars are
attracted to Coase. By "attract" I mean that many find his work gives
important insight to the legal system, and many others find his views
sufficiently disturbing to motivate them to respond. That legal scholars ranging from Richard Posner56 to Bruce Ackerman57 to Pierre
Schlag58 treat Coase's vision as an exemplary approach to law suggests
an attraction of the legal mind to Coase. That scholars ranging from
Robert Cooter59 to Owen Fiss60 to Mark Kelman 61 attack the vision
does not lessen this conclusion. For both supporters and opponents,
Coase has helped set the terms of debate about the legal system.
In sum, I think it fair to say that Coase correctly perceives himself
as outside the mainstream of economics; 62 by contrast, he has significantly influenced legal thought. It is far more difficult for a law student to graduate without a serious encounter with the Coase Theorem
favorable. Samuelson and Nordhaus note that neither Coase nor anyone else has shown that
parties necessarily reach efficient results from bargaining. Id. at 718-19.
53. H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1984).
54. See Shapiro, supra note 51, at 1543-44.
SS. See generally Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38 (1936) (complaining of
over-footnoting in law reviews).
S6. R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 7.
S7. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTI?:lG AMERICAN LAW 46·71 (1984),
S8. Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A View From
the Left, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 919.
S9. Cooter, supra note 4.
60. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986).
61. M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Kelman, supra note 31.
62. To put it more boldly (but for its placement in an obscuring footnote), Coase will never
win the Nobel Prize for Economics. Gary Becker, whom Coase thanks in his Preface (p. vii) and
whose interests overlap Coase's, will.
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than it is for students obtaining a Ph.D. in economics. If we accept
this premise, the interesting speculation is why Coase is so dominant
in legal scholarship, yet (by his own admission) is a bit player to economists. What insight can this attraction give us about law or legal
scholarship?
Before seeking answers we must remind ourselves that Coase has
several themes that radiate differently in law and in economics. First,
Coase emphasizes that extemality problems are reciprocal: the
rancher harms the com, but only because the farmer locates near the
9ows. Second, the Coase Theorem asserts that parties will reach efficient bargains regardless of initial legal entitlements, absent transaction costs. Third, Coase warns against favoring government
intervention simply because private markets work imperfectly. With
these various themes, the relative attraction of lawyers over economists to Coase is unlikely to have a single explanation.
A.

Insight~

and Paradigms

Perhaps Coase has more insights, for law than for economics. A
central question of law is whom the law should favor and how to justify favoring one group over, another. Traditionally, the law addressed
this by asking such questions as wl,.o had the property right, who
caused the harm, who acted reasonably. Coase, however, emphasized
the reciprocal nature of the problem and argued that legal analysts
could not determine who caused the harm until the parties' rights had
been defined. Further, no natural way of defining rights existed. The
Coasean approach was a major challenge, to the traditional way of
thinking about these fundamental issues. 63
In addition, legal academics before the Cqasean revolution rarely
considered 'the feedback effects of legal rules. The Coase Theorem,
which assumes that people will modify their behavior in response to
legal rules, presented a new mode of analysis. For example, in determining the effect' of a rule holding doctors negligent if they do not give
glaucoma tests, the Coase Theorem challenges legal scholars to consider that doctors still may not give the test if it is not cost effective. 64
Economists, on the other hand, are more apt to take the initial
distribution of rights or entitlements as given and examine how parties
will trade or respond to them. Thus, some of the "first-order" issues
of entitlements to which the Coase Theorem speaks are of lesser importance to economists. Further, econoxµists in 1960 were already accustomed to thinking of feedback effects, so the Coase Theorem was
63. See Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and Its Relationship to Modern Legal
Thought, 35 BUFFALO L. REv. 871 (1986).
64. See generally Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974); Wiley, The Impact
of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 345
(1982).
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less startling. 65 An arrogant economist might say of the Coase
Theorem:
Coase didn't tell economists anything we didn't already know. Legal
scholars were so mixed up in their thinking that an obvious point like
"people will negotiate around unfavorable legal rules if they can" was
news to them. This trivial point became a theorem.

One problem with the "relative insight" explanation is that Coase
thought in 1960, and continues to think today, that he is advising
economists how to· examine their issues, not advising lawyers how to
study the legal system. As he said in 1981, "I have no interest in lawyers or legal education. . . . My interest is in economics. . . . I do
think some knowledge of legal institutions is essential for economists
working in certain areas, but it's what it does to economists that interests me, not what it does to lawyers." 66 Coase thinks that economists
simply are too fixated on their own framework to listen to his message.
Coase's response suggests a related explanation: the greater receptivity of legal scholars to new approaches. 67 The timing of Coase's
message is important here. In 1960, when Coase published The Problem of Social Cost, legal scholars were thrashing. Legal Realism had
long since destroyed anyone's belief in the autonomy and formal logic
of law. Yet Legal Realism was an essentially negative insight. While
destroying prior assumptions about the coherence of law, it gave only
limited positive explanations. The economic approach arrived at a
time of self-doubt for many legal scholars. 68 Its claimed ability to explain the common law as a set of efficiency-enhancing rules was attractive, even though it ran counter to many intuitions and
p_resuppositions of legal scholars.
65. The Coase Theorem certainly was new to economists. George Stigler recalled the seminar where Coase first presented "The Problem of Social Cost" as "one of the most exciting
intellectual events of my life." The vote at the beginning of the seminar was 20 for Pigou, with
only Coase supporting his position. At the end, all participants voted for Coase. See Kitch, ed.,
The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970. 26 J.L. &
EcoN. 163, 221 (remarks of George Stigler).
66. Kitch, supra note 65, at 192-93. Coase continued his comment:
I think you can often learn more about how the economic system works by reading law
books and cases in law books than you can by reading economics books because you do get
descriptions of actual business practices which are difficult to explain. Many of the examples which are given in economics books are made up by the economists and don't represent
actual practices at all.
Id. at 193.
67. Lest I be accused of obliteration, let me acknowledge that the relative receptivity explanation draws on the approach of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn suggests that the search for truth occurs
within paradigms, and that someone calling for a new paradigm is unlikely to be heard unless the
old paradigm becomes too burdened with complexity or unsolved problems. See T. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
68. Obviously, all was not doom and gloom in law schools during the 1960s. In particular,
constitutional lawyers, defending or attacking the Warren Court, were the relatively new, major
players on the stage. The Coasean approach, which reemphasized private law, especially the
common law, sought to bring law and lawyers back to their roots. Perhaps this explains some of
its attraction.
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In contrast, in 1960 the economics profession was at a high point
of internal consensus and external prestige and influence. The Keynesian approach had seemingly tamed the business. cycle, and policymakers at the highest level listened to economists - witness the
famous Kennedy tax cut of 1963, enacted at the recommendation of
economists to stimulate aggregate demand. Stagflation and the debate
over deregulation were yet to come. In microeconomics, the central
questions revolved around comparisons of competition with monopoly
and oligopoly. Economists were content with their paradigm69 and
not interested in the questions of an anachronistic scholar urging instirtutional eco11.omics.
Today, Coase's questions are hot topics in economics. Economists
are keenly interested in examining the procedure and results of smallnumbers or nonmarket bargaining, such as occil.rs in internal labor
markets. But Coase has proven unhelpful to modem economists in
answering these questions, for he provides no model and little guidance on how bargains will be struck. His axiomatic theorem simply
asserts that efficient bargains will occur unless transaction costs prevent them. Coase was very elusive in suggesting what form these
transaction costs might take.
Economists are making progress on these issues, by turning to noncooperative models of bargaining as distinct from axiomatic models. 70
The seminal model may be by Ariel Rubenstein. 71 Modelling the decision to divide a pie, Rubenstein suggests that when bargainers know
how much the other side values a trade, the initial offer will be one the
other side will just be willing to accept. But theory and evidence suggest that bargaining will be inefficient when bargainers do not know
how much the other side values a trade. Economists are now trying to
design mechanisms by which parties will reveal their valuations and
thus be induced to bargain efficiently. The results suggest pessimism,
at least without heavy government involvement. A model by Myerson
69. One must be careful in attributing this to Coase. The claim that efficiency can explain
the common law comes largely from Richard Posner rather than Coase, who at best is ambiguous about his claims of efficiency. For example, when discussing the famous doctor/confectioner
case of Sturges v. Bridgman, 1 Ch. D. 852 (1879), Coase notes that "the judges seem to have been
unaware" that preserving the area for residential or professional use is desirable "only if the
value of the additional residential facilities obtained was greater than the value of cakes ... lost."
P. 107. See generally Schlag, supra note 58, at 923-24.
Perhaps this suggests a "great Person" theory for the relative prominence of Coase in law.
Richard Posner, an extremely prolific scholar, has championed the Coase Theorem in law. No
comparable advocate has been moved to apply Coase's insights in economics.
70. For an excellent and readable summary of these developments as they relate to the Coase
Theorem, see Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 J. EcoN. PERSP. 113 (1987).
71. Rubenstein, Pelfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 EcoNOMETRICA 97 (1982).
For a discussion ofRubenstein's model, see Sutton, Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction, 53 REv. EcoN. STUD. 709 (1986), and sources cited therein.
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and Satterthwaite, 72 for example, suggests that private contracts will
never be efficient if parties have private information about their valuations and are free to walk away from contracts that are unfavorable.
Some of this new economics literature cites Coase73 because Coase
asserted results about bargaining that the new literature attempts to
analyze. One might infer that Coase influenced the developments
here. But I think Coase correctly perceives he has not. These articles
are highly mathematical and present highly stylized models of bargaining. They could not have been written until economists developed
the technical tools of noncooperative bargaining theory, and precise
handling of the tools is what the economics profession admires and
rewards. Coase in no way influenced the development of these tools.
Indeed, as I noted earlier, 74 Coase has been hostile to the overly mathematical style of modern economics.
Coase remains, in other words, outside the paradigm of economics.
Certainly, as the new bargaining literature indicates, economists are
beginning to examine issues that are of interest to Coase. But his call
for economists to study more seriously the details of law and other
institutions is a cry in the wilderness. Economists are too likely to
hear it as a call for institutional economics. The battle over institutional economics was lost long ago. 75 It is not sufficient to roll up
one's sleeves and scrutinize in mind-numbing detail some industry or
market or firm without a clear theory of what one is looking for. The
mass of detail is too overwhelming, and the policy suggestions at the
end of the study fail to convince. The modern economics paradigm of
using theory to create falsifiable predictions, and then attempting to
falsify them through econometric study, makes economics feel like a
science. Anyone suggesting another approach is spitting into the
wind.

B.

The Politics of Coase

. Perhaps some of the attraction of Coase's ideas may be explained
by ideology. This is a disturbing view of scholarship, but one to which
lawyers in particular are accustomed. A lawyer or legal scholar has an
agenda, often a normative one, and may use whatever tools are helpful
in advancing that agenda. So if Coase's ideas further lawyers' agendas, they may be attractive to lawyers for that reason alone.
72. Myerson & Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms/or Bilateral Trading, 29 J. EcoN. THE265 (1983).
73. For example, Farrell cites Coase, but Rubenstein, Sutton, and Myerson and Satterthwaite do not.
74. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
75. See Kitch, supra note 65, at 175 (comments of Harold Demsetz). See generally id. at
231-33 (Kitch's afterword suggests three stories to explain the attraction of Chicago law and
economics: the truth of its vision, the demand for ideas to explain changing social conditions,
and the use of its ideas to legitimate the powerful).
ORY
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Undeniably, ideas are sometimes accepted or rejected because of
their political content. But a general warning about political explanations may be appropriate at the outset. This explanation for an idea's
attraction is perhaps too powerful, precisely because both acceptance
and rejection can be termed political.- Demsetz, for example, has asserted that institutional economists of the 1920s were "politically motivated" when they rejected economic price theory because they
"[d]esired to be shorn of the constraints that the theory ... impose[d]
on political action." 76 Demsetz's proposition can be turned on him, of
course. Perhaps the acceptance of price theory was similarly based on
politics: the desire to impose constraints on political action.
Certainly Coase's work has significant political overtones. Some
have suggested that it is politically conservative in the sense of favoring the rich over the poor and denouncing government intervention in
private markets. 1 7 Some might be tempted to use this political bias of
Coase to explain his attraction to legal scholars. 78 But I find the assumption that Coase - or, more accurately, his Theorem - is necessarily conservative to be dangerously overbroad. A fuller critiqµe of
the Theorem must distinguish the positive Coase Theorem of zero
transaction costs with the normative "mimic the market" policy prescription for high transaction costs. Those concerned with wealth distribution could embrace the costless Coase Theorem as an ally.
If transaction costs are low, the Coase Theorem declares that efficiency is unaffected by the placement of the initial legal entitlement.
This positive analysis has important normative implications. In particular, the costless Coase Theorem implies that efficiency arguments
are irrelevant in countering a proposal to give initial legal entitlements
to the needy or the deserving. The law has no reason to award entitlements to those willing and able to pay the n:iost for it because, under
zero transaction costs, the needy or deserving holders of the entitlement can trade it without any efficiency loss to those willing and able
to pay more. 79 We can emphasize this point by labelling it The Dis-

tributive Corollary of the Coase Theorem:
With zero transaction costs, initial entitlements cannot be justified on
efficiency grounds, and so should be awarded on the basis of need or
desert.
76. For disparaging remarks about institutional economics from George Stigler, Milton
Friedman and other members of the Chicago school, see Kitch, supra note 65, at 169-73.
77. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 38, at 911, 912; Kelman, supra note 31, at 673-78.
78. If scholars are attracted to an idea because of its political implications, and if the Coase
Theorem is politically conservative, and if legal scholars are more attracted to Coase than are
economists, one might conclude that legal scholars are more politically conservative than economists. Remembering that my definition of "attract" included active opponents, one might conclude that legal scholars are more politically polarized than are economists. While either
conclusion may be true, I suggest it so cautiously because I am skeptical of the first and second
assumptions required to make it.
79. See Gjerdingen, supra note 63, at 916-17 (1986).
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Who is needy or deserving is not self-evident, and indeed is a major
inquiry of moral philosophy. But the Distributive Corollary says our
inquiries should focus on ethics, since no trade-off exists between equity and efficiency. 80 Modem economists have little to say about this
ethical question. Legal scholars, who as jacks-of-all-trades are applied
philosophers as well as applied economists, have relatively more to
say. Perhaps the Distributive Corollary and its emphasis on ethics
suggests some of the relative attraction of the Coase Theorem to legal
scholars.
The Distributive Corollary applies only when transaction costs are
low. Indeed, some scholars have read into the Coase Theorem a normative principle of "mimicking the market" when transaction costs
are high. Under this approach (advocated most prominently by Richard Posner81), the law should award entitlements not to the needy or
deserving but to those who would have paid the most for it but for the
high transaction costs. This principle of wealth maximization, however, is only one approach to awarding initial legal entitlements under
high transaction costs. It reflects an ethical principle that must compete with other ethical arguments before we use it as the criterion for
awarding entitlements. In other words, we must compare Posner (perhaps amplified by the sympathetic approach of Nozick82) with
Rawls, 83 Dworkin, 84 and others before deciding how to award initial
entitlements. I am skeptical that even one who agrees with Coase's
positive analysis of the effect of law under low and high transaction
costs would side with Posner in an ethics debate with Rawls.
In sum, it is wrong to say that the positive Coase Theorem requires
a particular ethical view on wealth distribution. To put it crassly, acceptance of the Theorem does not require or even suggest that one
favors the rich over the poor. Indeed, one can use the Distributive
Corollary to defeat any efficiency-based arguments against favoring
the poor with entitlements.
The Coase Theorem does, however, lead one to certain views about
the relation between individuals and society, views that are controversial in the legal world. The Coasean approach, consistent with mainstream economics, views society as an amalgam of individuals and
views rights and entitlements as (potentially at least) commodities to
be traded to higher-value users. This individualistic, nonpaternalis80. Cf A. OKUN, EQUALITY ANO EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE-OFF (1975).
81. See R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-115 (1981). Coase was much more
ambiguous in advocating this "mimic-the-market" approach to legal policy. See Schlag, supra
note 58, at 933-43 (Posner gives Coase's insights a right-wing nonnative gloss).
82. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
83. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
84. Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, IO PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 283
(1981).

May 1989)

Coase Defends Coase

1197

tic, 85 noncommunitarian view of individuals' relation to society is
more frequently contested in law than in economics. Much legal
scholarship, particularly within Critical Legal Studies, has a different
premise. Much legislation is likewise based, at least on first examination, on a differing view: that law must protect people from themselves as well as others. 8 6
For liberal legal scholars accepting Coase's individualistic framework, however, a basic controversy is whether Coase's prime themes
are necessarily linked. Does emphasizing the importance of reciprocity and transaction costs in understanding markets make one skeptical
of government intervention to correct the problems posed by transaction costs? Far from being linked, the two insights may be in some
tension. Coase's vision of pervasive transaction costs emphasizes the
problems of markets. Market failure can occur from free riders, limited information, convex production sets, moral hazard, adverse selection, and bounded rationality, to name a few manifestations of
transaction costs. Liberals are attracted to this idea, for it emphasizes
that private markets do not produce optimal results. They can view
Coase's message about government intervention as merely a caution to
be careful.
Bruce Ackerman has taken this approach, separating Coase's two
themes and declaring that the essential Coasean insight justifies an
"activist" state. 87 Ackerman argues that Coase tells an activist story
at odds with the reactive legal order, which "assume[s] the legitimacy
of the ongoing structure of activities." 88 Coase's story has a "broad
temporal frame" that begins not when the cow strays into the farmer's
field, but by asking how the rancher and farmer might have structured
their activities to avoid trouble in the first place. This "is precisely the
point at which the activist lawyer would want to begin." 89
George Priest, reviewing Ackerman's project, is more skeptical
about separating the strands, concluding that "Coase's message is ultimately nihilistic." 90 Priest reminds Ackerman that "Coase's moral
8S. Schlag characterizes this Coasean (or what he would call Posnerian) view as "paternalistic" rather than nonpaternalistic. It is paternalistic, Schlag says, to require that individuals, to be
counted, express their needs and desires in terms of willingness to pay. See Schlag, supra note S8,
at 949, n.117.
86. Using a Critical perspective, Schlag has attempted to separate Coase from his right-wing
followers (principally Posner) by distinguishing the idea that the legal rule exists to maximize the
value that individuals place on society's good, from the more basic Coasean insights of reciprocity and what Schlag terms "feedback loop[s)." Schlag, supra note S8, at 926. Schlag sees something "radical and dialectical" here: "Coase's insight not only destabilizes the received wisdom
of the common law and its conventional moral and aesthetic architecture, but it puts us on guard
against thinking that a new architecture would somehow solve our problems." Id. Schlag recognizes, however, that most CLS scholarship is critical of Coase. Id. at 947 n.lOS.
'87. B. ACKERMAN, supra note S7, at S4.
88. Id.
89. Id. at S4, SS.
90. Priest, Gossiping About Ideas, 93 YALE L.J. 162S, 163S (1984).

1198

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:1171

judgments over the years were profoundly hostile to every form of the
activist state." 91 Owen Piss has likewise attacked the law and economics perspective on law.92
I sympathize with Ackerman's recasting of Coase's message. For
present purposes, however, it merely illustrates the political ambiguity
inherent in Coase. This ambiguity calls into question whether politics
best explains why lawyers have been more attentive than economists
to Coase and his Theorem. I think not: the cast of political characters
influenced by Coase is too complicated. The better explanation is a
matter of insights within paradigms. Academic lawyers ask more
questions than do economists (whether they find answers is a separate
question), and the Coasean framework is a provocative source for
those who venture beyond the dismal science.

91. Id.

92. Fiss, supra note 60, at 7.

